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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
When the peaceful uprising in Syria started in spring 2011 turned into an armed resistance after a few 
months in the face of savage repression by the Assad regime. Since then, the activists who picked up 
arms became dependent on support in money and arms to be able to continue. Few other than the 
Assad regime question this narrative. Yet the consequences of this dependence are often overlooked. 
The sources of funding for the rebels and the strings attached to them have since shaped the 
landscape of the armed rebellion, not the other way round. What we have in Syria is not an Islamist 
revolution but a popular uprising that received funding primarily from Islamist sources. 
Acknowledging this is essential and has far-reaching implications for defining an effective policy in the 
Syrian conflict. 
As the United States, France and regional powers of the Middle East prepare for what appears to be 
an inevitable military strike on the Syrian regime of Bashar el Assad, questions are posed more 
urgently than ever: how to work with the armed opposition? who are the reliable forces? what are 
their capabilities? which groups can be part of the plan to replace Assad and how can the extremists 
be contained? 
 This paper examines the circumstances and conditions that shaped the Syrian armed opposition and 
surveys the groups that remain committed to a democratic political system and a pluralistic society in 
Syria.  
It describes the extreme fluidity within the armed resistance which reflects primarily the diverse but 
most often unstable, and therefore, unreliable sources of funding for the rebels. It suggests ways to 
empower the pro-democracy groups as the best means to reach the dual objective of ending the 
dictatorship of Assad and achieving a democratic outcome in Syria and argues that the former 
objective has no chance of succeeding if the latter is not pursued simultaneously.    
A self-reinforcing and largely self-defeating spiral has been at play over the last two years.  Reluctance 
to provide the right kind of support at the right time has not resulted in lower levels of money and 
arm reaching the rebels but rather has allowed the wrong sources to become the main providers. 
With every increase in the support provided in exchange of loyalty to some Islamist agenda, fears 
have heightened among a growing number of Syrians regarding the outcome of the conflict and Iran 
has deepened its involvement on the side of the Assad regime to counter what it sees as a Saudi 
grand design of installing Sunni domination of the Wahhabi brand over the entire region. 
Unity of ranks in face of the regime remained for a long time the overriding rule for the armed 
resistance. But as extremist groups sought to dominate in certain areas, efforts by mainstream Syrian 
groups to re-gain control of the resistance and re-instate its original objectives are leading to a de 
facto triangular struggle involving the regime, radical Jihadi groups and the democratic opposition. 
These dynamics on the ground have major implications for policy:  
It is high time that Western governments make clear to their regional allies that support for certain 
groups with a non-democratic agenda is frightening to many Syrians and delaying the fall of Assad.  
If money and arms are defining the direction of the conflict, the fluidity of the armed groups should 
be used as an opportunity to shape the situation on the ground.  Western and regional powers should 
select and empower leaders of democratic groups to redress this balance in their favor within the FSA 
itself. If properly equipped, pro-democracy groups have the potential to spearhead a movement to 
Arab Reform Initiative 





alter the balance of power in the battlefield to their advantage and reassure a large portion of Syrians 
sitting on the fence.  
Basic relief for the fighters is just as important as the procurement of weapons. An effective strategy 
to allow pro-democracy groups to regain the initiative should combine civil and military support, 
bringing stable and reliable support as the only way for leaders of pro-democracy groups to retain the 
loyalty of their fighters and ensure effective command. Only at this condition is it possible to identify 
the groups that can be trusted and supplied with sophisticated weapons.   
The Supreme Military Command cannot be expected to alter on its own the balance of forces on 
the ground in favor of democratic groups. Donors have continued to select their own favorite groups 
even after the creation of the SMC. The SMC is a reliable channel but donors should designate the 
beneficiaries of the support in coordination with it.  
The Supreme Military Council should be assisted in its effort to chart an operational security plan for 
the protection of all vital sites and areas across the country.  Its chairman would be in a position then 
to seek the commitment of regional and local commanders to implement the plan thus allowing the 
SMC to vet groups in the process.  
 
Small multi-sectarian groups are fighting the regime in areas where it still enjoys support usually at 
hight risk for their security. Providing limited military support to such groups would go a long way in 
weakening the Assad family; it would pose a serious challenge to the regime which will hesitate to 
respond with massive bombings in the same way as it does in areas where the resistance is dominant; 
it would pre-empt the emergence of a demarcation line as a prelude to partition; lastly, it would 
mend relations between the various communities of the country after the regime worked to stir them 
up against each other. 
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One of the most challenging exercises in the Syrian conflict today is to identify all the groups 
fighting on the ground who call themselves revolutionary forces. In peaceful contexts, the process of 
identifying the groups which should be included in a political process usually involves scrutiny of their 
commitment to abide by democratic rules defined in a constitutional framework.  
Criteria differ, however, in the context of an armed conflict such as the one in Syria. As the regime 
is determined to destroy the social fabric of the country and is threatening the integrity of the Syrian 
state, the objective of ending Assad family rule becomes inseparable from the objective of rescuing 
both the state and society. It requires an approach that pursues both objectives at the same time. If 
the WHAT (Assad’s ouster) is unanimously shared by the armed groups and activists of the uprising, 
then the HOW becomes the real question. If the prominence of radical Islamist groups is frightening to 
many Syrians and to many countries (on both sides of the fence), then it is clearly a mistake to allow 
the domination of Islamist groups in the struggle to achieve the primary objective of removing Assad. 
For too long now, struggles over the HOW have been delaying the realization of the desired outcome.  
 
Over the last 18 months, dozens of investigative studies, reports and articles have been produced 
by intelligence and military officers, human rights organizations, scholars and journalists focusing 
almost exclusively on Islamist groups (Muslim Brothers, Salafis and Jihadists of various brands and 
origins). While the growth of such groups is indeed alarming and merits serious analysis, the volume 
of writing about them leaves observers with the impression that all the fighters on the ground are 
Islamist, that democratic groups are non-existent and that Assad’s removal will inevitably lead to 
control of Syria by Islamist forces. 
 
The Assad regime itself invests heavily in media networks to demonize his opponents. Its target 
audiences are first and foremost the political elites and public opinion of Western countries. It has 
engaged in smear campaigns against political figures and, since the confrontation evolved into 
primarily a military one, the regime has resorted to a multi-faceted strategy of infiltrating and 
manipulating certain groups while describing them all as Jihadists.  
 
This report provides an alternative and more accurate narrative. Based on a thorough field 
investigation inside Syria, it maps groups that have remained committed to the original demands of 
the uprising for a free, democratic and pluralistic Syria. It describes the factors that have shaped the 
movement on the ground, the conditions in which armed groups operate and the resilience of those 
national democratic groups that have, against all odds, maintained their commitment to a liberal 
Syria. It calls for a different approach by acknowledging where the pressure points lie and by working 
from two different ends: from the providers, who procure money and arms, and from the receivers, 
those political and military figures on the ground who inspire and provide guidance to resistance 
groups. 
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An active and intrusive approach appears necessary if support for the revolution is to succeed in producing 
the best outcome for a pluralistic Syria.  
 
This is not to say that democratic groups are isolated and need to 
be hand-picked from the midst of an ocean of Islamist Syrians. The 
Syrian revolution has not turned Islamist but is funded mostly by 
sources with an Islamist leaning, leaving revolutionary groups with a 
democratic bent struggling to survive as orphans in terms of sources 
of support.  
 
The terms ‘democratic’ or ‘pro-democracy’, as used here to 
describe different groups, are not based on ideological 
considerations but on the consideration of what is required for 
maintaining a pluralist and unified Syria, as will be explained below. 
 
If pro-democracy groups are provided with the right kind of support, this will catalyze and reveal the 
support that they enjoy within Syrian society, enabling them to grow rapidly. They can then reconnect the 
armed struggle with Syria’s diverse social environment and prompt a re-Syrianization of the uprising. The 
purpose of this report is to provide an operational map of reliable groups who have the potential to become 
launching pads for an active strategy. Our efforts to identify pro-democracy groups in this report are primarily 
aimed at extricating the struggle from the multiple agendas that have spilled into Syria over the last two years.  
 
The report does not advocate splitting the ranks of the resistance, particularly as the enemy remains whole: 
the Assad regime. The report does, however, call for applying highly selective criteria in vetting groups on the 
ground with a view to empowering them and shifting the balance among anti-regime forces in their favor. The 
groups described in this report and listed in the annex are ones that have shown consistent commitment to 
democratic principles throughout the last two years, even under dire circumstances. Some groups are certainly 
missing from the list and still need to be identified. The report should therefore be considered a work in 
progress and will be updated on a regular basis. 
 
We do not dispute the need to strengthen the formal bodies representing the political and the military 
opposition, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (or National Coalition of the 
Opposition) and the Supreme Military Council. These bodies are very much needed and the revolution has 
suffered long enough from the weaknesses and divisions within the opposition. Both should be supported and 
encouraged to develop institutional and executive capacity. But it is unrealistic to expect these new bodies to 
develop ties with groups on the ground or establish an organizational system overnight. This challenge is often 
under-estimated.  
 
The first section of the report clarifies the criteria used for selecting democratic groups. The next two 
sections describe the context that shaped the opposition movement on the ground over the last two years and 
outline the roles and activities of outside supporters and members of the opposition.  
 
The following two sections analyze the objectives and structures of various groups that work to uphold the 
unity of Syria and a pluralistic political system. The analysis is based on a thorough investigation undertaken 
inside Syria over the last two years, including lengthy discussions with political and military leaders of the 
opposition. A table of identified groups and their key attributes is included in the annex. Names of units and 
numbers of fighters fluctuate, reflecting the extreme fluidity of the military situation. The report analyses the 
constraints that cause this fluidity, provides a concrete account of patterns of cooperation in the battlefield and 
analyzes the causes of tension between groups.  
 
 
An active and intrusive 
approach appears 
necessary if support for 
the revolution is to 
succeed in producing the 
best outcome for a 
pluralistic Syria 
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The final section suggests directions for an effective strategy to limit the proxy aspect of the war, work 
towards re-Syrianizing the revolution and reassure the hesitant, terrified Syrians who fear both the regime and 
the instability.  
 
A note should be added on the choice of words in this report. Terms such as ‘revolution’, ‘conflict’, ‘rebel’, 
‘resistance fighter’, ‘democratic’, ‘liberal’ and ‘secular’ are highly charged. For Syrians, the narrative of the 
conflict is extremely important as the regime continues to invest much effort and funds into negating the 
crimes and horrors that its forces are committing. Our objective is not to engage in this controversy but to 
bring clarity for decision-makers who seek to build a strategy for achieving a democratic outcome.  
II. Who are the pro-democracy groups? 
The groups identified in this report were not selected on ideological grounds but rather based on one 
practical consideration: are they dedicated to preserving the integrity of Syria as a nation-state in which all 
citizens can feel they want to belong. In selecting the groups listed in the annex of this report, we strictly 
limited the selection to groups who showed clear commitment to the original liberal non-sectarian values 
which animated the popular peaceful uprising of spring 2011.  
 
By ‘pro-democracy’, we mean those groups who fight for 
establishing a Syrian state for all its current citizens, those who 
espouse a national agenda of pluralism, equal citizenship, and 
advocate the rule of one civil law for all. In addition to their 
commitment to principles, we also monitored considerations related 
to their actions since the start of the uprising in the civilian sphere, 
including the delivery of assistance to the population on a non-
discriminatory basis and the management of civil affairs (local 
councils, education curriculum, civil courts) in ways that preserve the 
civil nature of public institutions and diversity within society. The 
organization of the armed resistance on non-sectarian grounds and 
the treatment of detainees are also major criteria.  
 
Lastly, and most importantly, is the willingness of groups to abide by the decisions of a civil political 
authority and to be part of a comprehensive security plan for stabilizing the country, as the Supreme Military 
Council is seeking to do. Groups with these traits are those most likely to build a Syria which can govern itself, 
defend itself, and sustain itself. They do not have the capacity to do so without some outside assitance but they 
would be most amenable to cooperation with the governments of neighboring countries and international 
powers to bring security back to the region. These groups are the voice of a large section (arguably the 
majority) of the silent Syrians who are sitting on the fence. 
 
It would have been justified to include other groups described as moderate or mainstream Islamists, who 
should be clearly distinguished from the extremist and Jihadi groups. They reflect the moderate Islam, which 
Syrians like to call social Islam traditionally prevalent among the Sunni community in Syria and therefore are 
part of the social fabric of the country. Some are known to be close to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The 
political leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood is committed to a democratic and pluralistic agenda for post-
Assad Syria. This is clearly stated in the political platform of the Muslim Brotherhood published in 2004 and re-
confirmed in a document published in 2012. Several conservative religious leaders have also indicated their 
commitment to a political system that protects the rights of all minorities. Syrians from all communities and 
ideological backgrounds do not question the right of these figures to be part of the political transition and to 
play a role in the future political system.  
 
Groups identified here are 
the ones most likely to 
build a Syria which can 
govern itself, defend 
itself, and sustain itself 
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We have chosen, however, to exclude them from our report for two main reasons. First, they have received 
(and continue to receive) massive support in arms and money from sources that have denied non-Islamist 
groups the same kind of support. This has had the effect (even if unintended) of frightening more Syrians than 
of gaining supporters for the revolution. Second, the Assad regime’s strategy has sought to tear apart the social 
fabric and to call on its regional allies to transform the popular uprising into a sectarian conflict pitting Shias 
against Sunnis – including the formation of a purely sectarian militia of Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese Shias. In this 
context, providing further support to the Sunni Islamist groups is objectively playing into the hands of the 
regime. An effective strategy to counter these plans entails a targeted effort to empower the groups that are 
clearly committed to a unified, democratic Syria.  
  
Extremist Jihadi groups pose a problem of a different kind. Most Syrians see them as alien to the social 
and political fabric of the country. They run wild and shut down civilian life, calling for establishing an Islamic 
theocracy more often than they mention the fall of Assad. High ranking military officers of the Free Syrian Army 
and Muslim religious leaders have called on them on many occasions to leave the country. 
 
Maintaining unity in the ranks of the opposition has been unanimously seen as a requirement for success, 
mostly for valid reasons which remain relevant. Yet the moto of unity at any cost has often served as a cover 
for extremist Jihadi groups to work their way into Syria and promote their agendas without meeting significant 
resistance from other opposition members. As is shown below, combating extremist Jihadi groups should not 
be seen as a sign of further division but as an attempt to purge the ranks of the resistance from elements that 
bring it discredit. 
III. The context that shaped the movement on the ground  
 
The situation on the ground in Syria has been largely shaped, on one hand, by the extreme brutality of the 
Assad regime and, on the other hand, by the paralysis of the international community (as illustrated by the 
absence of a UN Security Council resolution condemning the repression).  
Manufacturing radicalism 
The regime resorted to disproportionate use of force from the 
first days of the uprising as part of what it believed had been a 
successful deterrence strategy over the four preceding decades. The 
motto of Assad’s father had been “terrorize and rule”. 
 
 His son and family had no better recipe to maintain their control 
over the country and protect their rule. The ideal enemy (who quickly 
becomes the best objective ally) in this strategy is extremism. The 
moderate and secular figures of the opposition become the most 
dangerous. They have been targeted in effect one after the other by 
the shabiha, the pro-Assad militias. 
 Victims include a surgeon assassinated in his medical clinic, a prominent economist and planner of local 
councils tortured to death in prison, Christian human rights lawyers defending prisoners and a prominent  




Moderate and secular 
figures of the opposition 
are seen as the most 
dangerous for the regime 
and are targeted one after 
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 The activists who started the peaceful uprising 
in 2011 were left with two options: either stop the 
uprising altogether (as peaceful protest became 
impossible) or take up arms. The appetite for taking 
up arms was unequal among the different groups. 
Many were torn and desperately sought new tactics 
to keep the movement peaceful. But as activists 
witnessed the killings of brothers, children or 
neighbors, or were tortured in prison, the incentive 
to fight became irresistible. The process of 
radicalization was set in motion. Periodic massacres 
(such as in al-Hoola in May 2012, al-Heffa in June 
2012, Daraya in August 2012, etc.), some of which 
were committed while the UN supervision mission 
(UNSMIS) was still on the ground in Syria, sent new 
young men to join the fight. 
     Eventually every group, even those most averse to the militarization of the struggle, became directly or 
indirectly implicated in the military resistance.  
 
‘Only God is with us’ 
A combination of factors created what the activists on the ground call a “godly climate”. When the regime 
moved to use the most extreme forms of violence, - including the use of chemical weapons at a smaller scale 
than the attack on the Damscus Ghouta in August 2013 - upholding the struggle was not anymore a question of 
“who is ready to fight” but increasingly “who is willing to die”. Jihad became the most effective rallying cry.  
 
The lack of sophisticated weapons was decisive in giving the Jihadi groups a prominent role in the military 
confrontation with the regime. In the absence of effective weapons to face the advances of the regime’s 
artillery and air force, bombings and suicide attacks against strategic targets such as security buildings and 
military bases, became the only way to hurt the enemy and achieve some successes in an asymmetrical war. 
Jihadis excel at this type of tactics and can become a weapon in their own right. Jihadi groups were determined 
to use this battlefield edge to win the space to impose their rules on areas they came to control. 
 
The inadequate international response and the fact that no force stepped in to protect the civilian 
population from slaughter have had devastating consequences. Not only was a Libya-like intervention (which 
many Syrians had hoped for) out of the question, but it was not even possible to achieve minimal agreement 
among members of the UN Security Council to condemn the crimes of the regime or to secure the channeling 
of humanitarian relief to the civilian population. More than two years into the conflict, regional and 
international inhibitions, strategic interests and rivalries allow criminal behavior to continue with impunity, 
leaving Syria’s people with a bitter feeling of having been abandoned.  
The curse of geopolitics 
Syria emerged as the most sensitive pivot of the complex regional equation. The regime’s efforts focused on 
making the sectarian issue a key element of its strategy. The approach seemed to be “If you can’t divide and 
rule, divide to prevent anyone else from ruling, and trigger spill-over and spill-in, exporting risks and importing 
new dangers.” 
Loyalist slogan written on the wall of a 
village in Idlib; “al-Assad or we burn the 
country”. 
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These factors combined to create the conditions for a proxy war. Every group engaged in the fight became 
dependent on external financial and military support, and hence vulnerable to manipulation. The regime 
increasingly relied on the support of its allies and on the opposition side, money and arms were made available 
to those who agreed to swear loyalty to a patron, and patrons multiplied rapidly.  
 
In the Middle East, funding is overwhelmingly from Islamic sources and brings with it a conservative agenda. 
Money circulates through complex channels, some of which are controlled by governments but many of which 
are managed through private business and religious networks. These networks were first established in the late 
1970s and early 1980s to support the Islamic resistance in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation, and have 
been re-activated during conflicts in the Balkans, Algeria, Yemen and Iraq over the last three decades. While 
some of the funds are channeled with the blessing of the governments of Gulf countries, thus making them 
directly responsible for the Islamization of the resistance, these networks are often richly endowed with 
private resources and are in some cases too powerful for governments to confront, even if they chose to.  
 
Syrian fighters have become recipients of this aid and leaders of military groups drew influence and power 
over their fighters thanks to their ability to secure funds and arms. The regime thus created the incentive 
(bringing along its own patrons to fight on its side); conservative religious networks provided the means and 
tools to the resistance; and with those came multiple political agendas.  
The role of the political opposition 
While the multiple sources of funding and agendas are largely responsible for the fractionalization of the 
armed opposition, the political opposition also carries part of the responsibility for the broader lack of 
cooperation among anti-regime groups. The lack of any experience in working and planning jointly, and let 
alone leading a military confrontation, the lack of trust, partisan competition, personal ambitions and, last but 
not least, the readiness of figures in key positions to serve the interests of influential regional actors, all 
combined to make consistent coordination between the political leadership of the opposition and the armed 
groups on the ground a wish that never materialized. Neither the Syrian 
National Council established in November 2011 nor the National Coalition of 
the Opposition created a year later succeeded in serving as a national 
political umbrella for the armed opposition. Instead, different political 
factions developed their own ties with different groups on the ground. Here 
again, many among the liberal democratic camp within the opposition 
remained reluctant for some time to acknowledge that the armed struggle 
was inevitable, while the Islamist forces were quick to start organizing the 
flow of arms and, when the first officers defected from the Syrian army, to 
seek to control them through funding. Fighters, both civilians and military 
officers, who were averse to the Islamization process of the revolution 
longed for political guidance and support from political figures who failed to 
engage with them. 
 
Since the resistance became armed, sources of funding and the strings attached to them have been shaping 
the landscape, not the other way round. The Syrian revolution has not become Islamist but is desperately in 
need of support and has largely received funds and arms from Islamist sources, some controlled by identifiable 
sources and others controlled by shadowy networks that connect the most improbable bedfellows. Tracing 
them is complex and is tied to the internal politics of the Gulf states and to the multiple games that Iran, Iraq 
and the Syrian regime have played in recent decades. This important issue merits a thorough investigation 
which falls outside the scope of this report. Its implications for Syria, however, are at the heart of our subject. 
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Once a group of activists has picked up arms, it must secure ammunition at any price and its leader is 
required to at least feed its fighters. As petty as this may sound, it is at the heart of the problem. During the 
early days of the armed uprising, opposition figures joked that “The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is for sale”. Armed 
groups choose names for their brigades that are likely to please the funders. It has often been reported how 
some governments and private networks suggest that a group change its name in order to receive financial and 
military support in exchange. Many groups spontaneously choose Islamic names, resort to religious vocabulary 
and strive to project an image of religiosity through their media statements and Facebook pages.  
 
When a leader cannot provide for the minimum vital needs of his fighters who face the risk of death every 
day and when he cannot secure the arms and ammunitions that allow the fighters to take an effective role in 
battles while they watch well equipped Islamist brigades with frustration, they end up abandoning their leader 
and the group to join better endowed units, which to date have invariably been more radical. If anything, this is 
indicative of the determination of the fighters not to give up the fight rather than of any fundamentalist 
inclinations. Exceptions such as Kataeb Wehda Wataniya (KWW) described below provide a model not only 
because they are secular and multi-sectarian but because they received steady funding from non-islamist 
sources and kept their identity and cohesion even though they did not find the means to grow.  
 
Once the well-supported groups gain military control over areas, the continued flow of money provides 
them with the means to control the distribution of vital commodities, medical care, the management of 
hospitals and the production of oil. More alarming for their long term implications are the opening of religious 
courts and the enforcement of Islamic Sharia law and the control of education through the imposition of a 
fundamentalist curriculum of the Wahhabi brand in schools.  
 
The Islamist armed groups have been particularly focused on the imposition of Islamic law. Professional 
lawyers and judges with connections to Syrian civil law are denounced either as “secular” (which amounts to 
atheism in their vocabulary) or as agents of the Baath regime. Civil courts in the rebel-held areas are often 
threatened and some are forced to close. In Dooma for example, a rebel-held town in the suburbs of 
Damascus, all attempts at opening a functioning civil court have failed. Local liberal leaders and the few lawyers 
who remain in the city (only 5 out of 200 lawyers have not fled) say that only when the FSA (by which they 
mean the non-Jihadi moderate groups supported by the Supreme Military Council) gains control will it be safe 
to enforce civil law. In the north, a few successes exist such as in the town of Salqin where the legal body (hay’a 
shariya) which applies religious law abandoned it to Jabhat al-Nosra which in turn abandoned it, allowing civil 
lawyers to take over. In Aleppo, non-Islamic professional lawyers and judges are seeking to reach a common 
understanding with the Supreme Military Council and the newly created local police force to gradually restore 
civil law into the city.   
Is the tide turning? 
Recent developments, have encouraged a change of attitude among liberals and among non-politicized 
armed groups which are generally averse to the Islamists’ political agenda. In liberated areas such as al-Raqqa, 
al-Tabqa, Douma, the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib province, there has been a steadily growing trend over 
the last year of increasing resentment among those who want a liberal democratic Syria. In the name of 
protecting a sacred unity in face of the regime, liberal democratic armed groups have remained discreet about 
their resentment and largely powerless lacking the basic means to challenge the radical groups. Many of their 
leaders believed that the showdown with the extremists was inevitable but considered that the time had not 
come for opening this second front. They thought that this could only benefit Assad and that it should be 
postponed until after the fall of the regime. Instead, they sought dialogue and sought a modus vivendi with 
Islamist groups.  
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The change of attitude has been induced by several factors. First, the extremists of Jabhat al-Nosra and the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (both offshoots of al-Qaeda) began to impose strict rules and provocative 
measures which alienated large segments of the Syrian population thus showing what many saw as their “true 
(ugly) face”. Second, the earlier successes of the Jihadis have not been consolidated and have failed to tip the 
balance in favor of the anti-Assad resistance. Third, the opposition, both political and military, has come to 
believe that the motto of unity has become counterproductive, that it has been used by the Islamist forces and 
their patrons as a cover to dominate the political opposition and the resistance, and that it has frightened a 
large portion of the hesitant Syrians sitting on the fence, thus damaging the image of the revolution altogether. 
Lastly, the debates in the United States Congress, the British Parliament and the European Union on the 
dangers related to the delivery of sophisticated weapons to the opposition for fear that the arms might end in 
the hands of extremists has undoubtedly emboldened some groups to come out and state clearly where they 
want to belong. But their message is invariably the same: if the means are made available, we will be in a 
position to reverse the trend on the ground.  
 
Liberated areas offer stark examples of the unwillingness of resistance groups and of the civilian population 
to provide cover for the abuses of the extremists. Section IV below provides examples from the field of the 
clashes that are multiplying between mainstream resistance groups and radical Jihadis. These cannot be 
equated with infighting within an already fractious armed opposition. Rather, they are attempts to rid the 
resistance of alien elements who worked their way into Syria and stand as an obstacle to unifying the ranks of 
the FSA. These efforts contribute to the goal of re-syrianizing the movement. FSA leaders (and hopefully their 
foreign patrons) now understand the damage caused by the willingness of some FSA units to work with Jabhat 
al-Nosra and realize that this cooperation made the West reluctant to provide military aid and gave Mr. Assad 
an opportunity to depict the entire opposition as driven by foreign-backed extremists. 
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IV. The forces on the ground 
The Role of the Supreme Military Council 
It is rarely noted that most defected military officers from the Syrian army are steeped in the dominant 
political culture of post-independence Syria which is nationalist and secular. Their language, vision, priorities 
and reactions to events indicate clearly a nationalist, albeit a pan-Arabist bent. They often see that the Assad 
regime has led astray the true nationalist doctrine of the Syrian army and used it as a cover to build its 
sectarian special forces to dominate and control the armed forces. Hence when we use the word ‘nationalist’ 
we refer to this political culture which permeates very widely the army and is also a strong feature within large 
sectors of society.  
 
The November 2012 creation of the Supreme Military Council 
(SMC) with General Salim Idriss at its head is a significant 
achievement in the process of organizing a large part of the armed 
resistance on the ground that operated under the franchise of the 
Free Syrian Army but did not have any command structure of sort.
1
 
The actual integration and unification of command can only start to 
happen if regional and international supporters of the resistance 
develop serious coordination among themselves. Salim Idriss’s 
elevation to the head of the SMC is a reflection of such a 
consensus. He is respected among Syrian military defectors and fighters for his personal qualifications and 
integrity. So far, however, he has been a mere coordinator for the channelling of military supplies and admits 
that he has little authority over troops on the ground. Many testimonies from the ground indicate that donors 
most often dictate their conditions to him by designating specific armed groups as beneficiaries of their aid. 
Idriss has therefore been treading the path drawn for him and has not been in a position to decide on priorities 
as he sees them. This complicates his relationship with the 30 military leaders who form the unified High 
Command of the SMC and expect to have a say in the distribution of money and arms channelled through 
Idriss.  
Idriss is first and foremost a professional military officer with no 
apparent political leanings. He clearly favours military officers when 
dealing with armed groups and is pushing for the creation of military 
divisions led by professional army officers. In June 2013, when the 
National Coalition of the Oppposition, the formal representative 
body of the opposition was expanding, it decided to include 
representatives of the SMC in an effort to enhance coordination 
between the political and military opposition. General Idriss was 
asked to designate 15 military figures. These commanders have all 
come out in support of the non-Islamist camp within the coalition, 
thus reducing the influence of the Islamist groups.  
In brief, the creation of the SMC does not resolve the problem of determining which groups to support 
within Syria. Donors have continued to select their own favored groups after the creation of the SMC by 
earmarking funds to certain groups even when channeling through the SMC.  
                                                          
1 On the formation and structure of the SMC, see ELIZABETH O’BAGY, The Free Syrian Army, Middle East Security Report 9, Institute for the 
Study of War, March 2013 
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Idriss will need to be a key pillar in any comprehensive plan for the armed opposition that may be 
developed with the active collaboration of regional actors (notably the Gulf monarchies and Turkey), the 
United States and European countries. However, he cannot be expected to alter on his own the balance of 
forces on the ground in favour of democratic groups.  
Pro-democarcy Fighters 
Detailed research has been published on the various Islamist groups and coalitions of the rebellion, 
overshadowing the non-Islamist groups. These groups do not have sufficient resources to develop national 
franchises in the same way as Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nosra (JAN), the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) or the 
Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF).  
Despite the apparent pervasiveness of Islamic coalitions, many armed groups who operate under the 
franchise of the Free Syrian Army have maintained their political identity against all odds, refusing to become 
the implementing arms of foreign donor agendas. We have chosen to call these groups “pro-democracy 
fighters” as their agenda is limited to the original democratic objectives of the uprising. They can be organized 
into three categories. 
The first category includes groups initiated by senior military 
defectors. These groups usually resent the politicization of their 
actions and consider that the army should stay out of politics. They 
sought to coordinate their actions with the primary body of the 
political opposition, first the Syrian National Council and later the 
National Coalition of the Opposition, but they refused to swear 
loyalty to any particular group and have been consistently 
marginalized in favor of more ideologically flexible civilian-led 
brigades.  
The second category includes groups anchored in a political 
movement. These are mostly revolutionary activists who find 
guidance from political parties or figures with socialist, communist, 
nationalist or liberal affiliations.  
These affiliations include the Socialist Union party, the People’s party, the Nasserite party, the Democratic 
Baath party and a constellation of newer movements which are a mix of civil society organizations and political 
movements such as Muwatana, Nabd, Maan, the Democratic Pole, Kuluna Sooriyoon and a host of others. 
These groups have also been unable to grow due to a lack of access to resources.  
The third category includes locally rooted groups whose names usually contain a reference to their village 
or neighborhood and who largely have minimal or mixed political leanings and rely on local resources and 
personal networks for support.  
We describe only a few groups from each category as examples but there are innumerable groups spread 
across the country. Abu Ali, the richest man in a small town in the north who sold all his property to fund a 
brigade continues to drain his family’s resources to secure food and ammunition for the fighters. HT, a wealthy 
secular businessman in his thirties from a bourgeois family created with his friends a brigade in Damascus and 
bought light arms from their own finances. They yearn for support and look to integrate with some organized 
group. Abu Rakan, a retired officer from the army but with a family fortune, sold all of the household’s cars, 
family jewels and valuables to buy arms and secure ammunition for his fighters. Countless leaders of small 
brigades from all social classes have done the same. Once they had exhausted their resources, they waited for 
months for support from governments who had declared Assad illegitimate and his repression of the uprising 
unacceptable. Some ended up turning to Islamist sources to secure support, often explaining with 
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embarrassment and regret that they were left with no other choice.  
Despite all the incentives offered by well-endowed Islamist groups, the pro-democracy brigades continue to 
exist. The recent resentment among local inhabitants of Islamist groups seeking to impose their rules has 
encouraged pro-democracy groups to work towards unifying their ranks. All of the pro-democracy groups 
described in the following section recognize the authority of the SMC. 
 
Kataeb al-Wehda al-Wataniya (KWW) 
  
The Kataeb al-Wehda al-Wataniya (KWW)
2




The coalition was created in August 2012 along with its 
political branch, first called the Tayyar al-Wehda al-
Wataniya (National Unity Movement).
4
 Activists and 
intellectuals close to this movement gathered in spring 
2013 under the name of Kuluna Sooriyoon (We are all 
Syrians).
5
 The movement was initiated by opposition 
figures from the Alawite community and brought in 
prominent liberal democratic figures from all sectarian 
communities. 
 The political movement is based on democratic principles with a strong emphasis on the proection of 
diversity and has a strong operational approach focusing on social reconciliation on the ground including the 
negotiation of truces between villages from different sectarian communities, the liberation of prisoners from 
both sides, assistance to defecting army soldiers as well as relief work in mixed areas.  
The number of armed fighters in the KWW is estimated at 2000. Their main strongholds are in Reef Jisr al-
Shughoor (Western Idlib) and the southern neighborhoods of Damascus. They also have a significant presence 
in Jabal al-Zawiya (Idlib province) and smaller units in Deraa and Deir Ezzor. 
The KWW brigades are often multi-sectarian, including in certain 
sensitive areas such as Reef Latakia and two brigades operate in Salamiya 
(Reef Hama) containing Ismaili fighters. 
Despite regular demands from independent brigades and 
individuals to join the group, the KWW often turn down newcomers 
due to a lack of resources. We were able to verify that hundreds of 
fighters have been told that they can only join the KWW if it manages 
to secure more funding. 
In January 2013, the authors met the leader of a group of 200 fighters 
in Jabal al-Zawiya, who asked to join the KWW. His group was a member 
of Ahfad al-Rasool, a mainstream Islamist coalition inside the FSA. The 
leader claimed that they had joined this Islamist coalition in order to 
receive support but now decided to leave as they could no longer bear the 
                                                          
2 National Unity Brigades. 
3 Information about this group was collected through regular contacts with political and military leaders and several visits in the province of 
Idlib between January and June 2013. 
4 www.syria-nul.com 
5 www.allsyrians.org 
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ideological discourse of the group. In June 2013, an independent FSA group of 1000 fighters of northern Idlib 
asked to join the KWW coalition. In both cases the KWW decided that they could not accept them into the 
coalition as they were not able provide them with ammunition.  
The KWW rely on donations from Syrian expatriates, including members of the exiled Alawite community. A 
committee was formed abroad and is in charge both of vetting individuals and groups who want to join the 
KWW, and of the distribution of money, ammunition and weapons. This support has allowed the KWW to 
survive but is not significant enough to allow them to grow.  
In al-Jabal al-Wastani and Sahl al-Rouj (Western Idlib), the KWW are the strongest force on the ground, 
despite the presence of some radical elements in nearby fronts. They actively participated in the liberation of 
the region and are now on the front line of the battle for the town of Jisr al-Shughoor. This region is mostly 
Sunni but there are isolated Alawite, Shiite, and Christians villages. Many civilians from these minority 
populated villages have fled but the KWW have put great efforts into convincing minorities to stay and have 
prevented the occupation of empty Alawite houses by radical armed groups who tend to consider Alawite 
property as spoils of war. Contacts have been made between leaders of Katibat Ahrar Bdama and Liwa’ 
Shuhada’ al-Jabal al-Wastani (both part of the KWW) and community leaders who have demanded security 
guarantees for the return of populations to their villages. The KWW does not have the sufficient resources, for 
the moment, to ensure protection for the return of these populations. 
In Western Idlib and in Northern Latakia, the KWW are now cooperating with defected judges to open civil 
courts implementing Syrian civil and criminal law, despite pressure and threats from the now widespread 
sharia courts. At least two courts have started operating since  uly     .  
The KWW recognizes the authority of the Supreme Military Council despite the fact that they have not 
received any support from it. Thus the KWW operate autonomously from the SMC, as do most opposition 
groups in Syria. More recently, the KWW have participated in the formation of the Jabhat Ahrar Sooriya (JAS),
6
 
a secular oriented coalition under the umbrella of the SMC, led by Colonel Qassem Saad Eddin. As the future of 
the JAS depends on the financial and military support it hopes to receive, at the time of the publication of the 
report the KWW continues to exist as an autonomous coalition within the JAS (described below). 
 
Jabhat Ahrar Sooriya (Front of the Freemen Syrians)7 
 
The leader of the Jabhat Ahrar Sooriya (JAS), Colonel Qassem 
Saad Eddin, is an air force pilot by training and a leading 
FSA colonel from the town of Rastan who defected from 
the air force in February 2012
8
 along with hundreds of 
officers and initiated the first military councils in spring 
2012. Al-Rastan, a small town North of Homs is known to 
be a stronghold of the Syrian military and has provided 
thousands of officers to the Syrian regular army. Former 
Minister of Defense Mustapha Tlass, who served for 
decades under Hafez al-Assad, is from al-Rastan and was 
the artisan of the massive enrollment of young men from 
his hometown into the army. His son Manaf was the 
                                                          
6 Front of the Freemen of Syria 
7 The authors conducted several trips to Syria and Turkey to meet with leaders of the JAS. The last trip to Northern Syria was end June 
2013.  
8 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nqWLrhs6bxo 
Jabhat Ahrar Sooriya 
Front of the Freemen of Syria 
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Colonel Qassem Saad Eddin, 
 Leader of the JAS 
commander of the Republican Guard until his defection in 
July 2012. 
Colonel Saad Eddin established the first military council in Homs and later in other provinces with the goal 
of building a military organization for the rebellion. Though a practicing Muslim, he is known for his liberal 
opinions and rejection of an Islamist agenda based on the principle that an army has no business in taking any 
ideological position. He, along with other high and middle rank defectors, were sidelined by regional donors 
who preferred to support groups willing to espouse their agenda. He has managed to maintain significant 
popularity as he is one of the figures of the FSA leadership who remained inside Syria. He is now one of the 30 
members of the unified High Command of the SMC and its spokesperson inside Syria.  
In May 2013, Colonel Saad Eddin, announced the creation of JAS, the Front of the Freemen of Syria, under 
the direct authority of the SMC.
9
 This group brings together secular, nationalist and moderate forces that had 
mostly been left out of existing networks of resource distribution. The Front grew rapidly in the north and 
central regions of the country and numbered over 20 000 fighters within a few weeks. 
Until July 2013, the JAS was composed of battalions and brigades that kept their names and leaders 
unchanged. Six weeks after its formation however, the leadership of the Front decided to reorganize by 
forming divisions, brigades and battalions holding numbers instead of names on the model of the Syrian Army. 
It was decided that each group should be either led or assisted by a defected officer. In July 2013, the nascent 
structure of the JAS included a military command, political advisors and fifteen specialized branches. Along with 
the military branches, all led by senior officers (colonel and above), the JAS has set up a judicial office, led by 
the defected military judge Lieutenant Adnan Kawkab, a member of the High Command of the SMC. This office 
is also composed of lawyers
10
 in charge of ensuring the respect for international conventions. A political 
committee was formed by intellectuals and politicians in the liberated areas to assist and advise the military 
leaders of the JAS.  
The creation of the Front aims at establishing a balance of power with other organized fronts such as the 
Jabhat al-Nosra (the radical Jihadi group linked to al-Qaeda and completely independent from the SMC) and 
the Syrian Islamic Front and Syrian Islamic Liberation Front which are partly under the SMC's authority. These 
Islamist fronts have been able to create national franchises thanks to their ability to access important resources 
in the early stages of the armed struggle. Colonel Saad Eddin's Front, the JAS is the largest non-Islamist 
organized coalition at a national level and probably the largest group under the direct authority of the SMC. 
The most active and integrated brigades of the Front are located in northern Syria (Aleppo, Idlib and Hama),
11
 
but the group is currently growing in Homs, and has smaller units in the other provinces.  
 
Colonel Saad Eddin and Colonel Zyad Haj Obeid, both 
members of the SMC leadership, created the “brigade for the 
protection of civilians and of public and private property” in April 
2013.
12
 This brigade operates in Aleppo city and countryside and 
has several units in charge of protecting factories and public 
buildings as well as a special unit in charge of investigating cases 
of looting.  
 
                                                          
9 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pMKAZP2dnAM 
10 Most of the lawyers are members of the Tajamuu al-Muhameen al-Ahrar, the Free Lawyers Association based in Antakya who promote 
the application of the Syrian civil and criminal law in the liberated areas. 
11Authors were present at a gathering of leaders of brigades of the JAS on June 23rd in Northern Syria and conducted series of interviews. 
12http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3mn07HBDGo 
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General Ahmad al-Faj 
General Abdel-Nasser Farzat 
 leader of Jabhat Ahrar Halab 
 
Senior Military Figures 
High ranking officers of the Free Syrian Army have been able to build a strong reputation, leading efficient 
brigades while maintaining a strict military and nationalist identity. Despite their experience, local support and 
military successes, they have received far less support than other groups who had accepted to abide to 
islamists agendas.  
General Ahmed Al-Faj leads the Tajamuu Alwyat al-Muutasim 
billah in Atareb, Aleppo. This group is known for having led the 
long siege and battle of Military Base 46 from September to 
November 2012, one of the most crucial battles for the 
liberation
13
 of the province of Aleppo.
14
 General Ahmad al-Faj 
holds great resentment against radical groups such as Fajr al-
Islam and Jabhat al-Nosra who he accuses of having only 
participated in the final assault of the base to get hold of war 
spoils. His group includes 1500-2000 fighters and some heavy 





General Abdel-Nasser Farzat leads Jabhat Ahrar Halab,
16
 a 
coalition of brigades fighting in Aleppo Province. Like General Ahmed 
al-Faj and Colonel Qassem Saad Eddin, he has never left Syria since 
the the beginning of the uprising. He proudly claims to have refused 
funding from Islamic networks and insists that despite pressures, he 
refused to change the name of his unit for a religious or politically 
connotated name. He emphasizes the need for the FSA to keep a 
strict military discipline and identity. He even claims that he has 
never defected from the Syrian Army, but simply joined the FSA.  
 
Community based groups 
Tribes  
The tribes of Syria are a key force among the anti-Assad armed resistance. They are present mainly in the 
Hama, Hasakeh, Deir Ezzor and Raqqa provinces as well as in the Horan region in the south. Tribal groups are 
well organized and armed thanks to their strong connections across the border with tribes in Iraq as well as 
with the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula in all the Arab Gulf monarchies. While some tribes have struck alliance 
at the local level with Islamists and Jihadi groups, many FSA brigades composed and led by tribal figures oppose 
and sometimes clash with extremist forces. For security reasons, they did not accept that we disclose 
information about them.  
                                                          
13 Apart from the western part of Aleppo City and several surrounded positions, the province of Aleppo is under opposition control.  
14 Syrian Rebels set-up camp on hilltop Base 46, al-Arabiya News November 21 2012. 
15Several interviews were conducted with General Ahmad al-Faj in June 2013 in Atareb. 
16 The Front of the Freemen of Aleppo 
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Liwa’ Shuhada’ Dooma 
Dooma 
The suburban city of Dooma is in many ways a microcosm of the Syrian resistance. It provides a perfect 
illustration of the efforts by democratic political forces to resist the rise and growing domination of Islamist 
forces. Dooma was one of the first towns to be entirely liberated from regime forces in the Damascus area and 
probably the largest town controlled by the resistance outside the liberated north. A large portion of the 
inhabitants have been displaced and the remaining population is approximately 200 000. Dooma is located in 
the northern part of the Eastern Ghoota in the suburbs of Damascus. It has been under opposition control since 
the end of the summer 2012, and has since been under an intense military siege. It has been dubbed the 
Stalingrad of Syria due to the massive destructions. Dooma is historically a stronghold of the opposition to the 
regime. It is home to some of the most prominent figures of the leftist and nationalist opposition figures and 
has always been watched with distrust by the Assad regime. Understandably, the army has avoided recruiting 
any officers from Dooma.  
The armed rebellion in Dooma is almost entirely organized 
and led by civilians
17
 and influential political activists while 
traditional respected figures and community leaders provide 
guidance to the armed groups.  
In spring 2013, eight military units of diverse political 
orientation operating in Dooma came together on the basis of 
their rejection of rigid and extremist Islamists and formed a 
coalition with the hope of regaining control over the city from the 
Salafists. Its member groups are all led by Arab nationalist, 
moderate Islamist, Nasserite or socialist local figures. Liwa’ 
Shuhada’ Dooma and Liwa’ Usood al-Ghoota
18
. They are the two 




Liwa’ al-Islam, led by Zahran Alloosh, (the son of a Wahhabi sheikh) is the best-endowed armed group with 
some 16 000 fighters operating in Dooma and the surrounding area. The Salafi Liwa’ has been able to take 
control of strategic institutions such as the prison of al-Touba and the tribunal. It has monopolized the 
distribution of wheat and taken control of buildings for the delivery of various social services. Liwa’ al-Islam 
enjoys consistent outside support, mostly from unidentified sources and is the only group in Dooma that pays 
its fighters a regular monthly salary. Liwa’ al-Islam’s hegemonic and authoritarian practices, as well as recent 
misbehavior,
20
 have caused resentment among the inhabitants of Dooma. The Liwa’ is also held responsible for 
poor military planning in waging the battle of al-Keemia’ which lasted over 8 months and caused the loss of 
more than 1200 fighters. It was accused of having deliberately stopped short of launching the assault on al-
Keemia’ after receiving orders from outside political forces linked to the agenda of its foreign donors and 
sacrificed lives unnecessarily. While it is difficult to verify the accuracy of this story, it is clear that massive 
defections from the Liwa’s ranks have occurred after the battle and that its popularity has been severely 
affected. This has given new momentum to the other political and military forces which emerge as competing 
forces but continue to suffer from the lack of resources to gain the upper hand.  
As long as the battle to break the siege of the town by regime forces is ongoing, all forces – Islamist or 
secular – fight together in the battlefield.
21
 However, they do not share arms, ammunition or financial 
                                                          
17 Liwa’ al-Bara’, led by the Captain Abu al-Nasr from Rastan, assisted by two local activists.  
18 Other brigades are listed at the end of the report 
19 Shabab al-Huda battalion, a mainstream Islamist group close to the Muslim Brotherhood is part of the Coalition. It is generously funded 
by the Muslim Brothers but does not share its resources with other brigades and battalions in the coalition.  
20 Liwa’ al-Islam is accused of looting and occupying public buildings, and committing assassinations.  
23 In May 2013 all of the FSA units in Dooma gathered and formed the Majles al-Mujahidi, to coordinate the battle against the regime, and 
to try to break the siege of the Ghoota. 
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Colonel Marwan al-Hamal (right) 
 leader of the Revolutionary military 
council of Sweida 
resources and when it comes to the control and management of the town, armed groups and political figures 
from the two groups operate in a context of strong competition. 
 
Deraa-Suweida’ 
While extremist Jihadi groups have not been able to consolidate their presence in the south as they have in 
the north, Islamist groups have been able to control networks of resource distribution and have strongly 
influenced the political orientation of the armed groups on the ground. In Deraa, several FSA units are led by 
defected officers or civilians with a clear democratic and liberal orientation. The authors of the report are in 
contact with them, but were not authorized to disclose the names of their units and of their leaders as they 
fear to be publically identified as “non-Islamists” and thus boycotted by donors. Members of non-Islamist units 
complain of discrimination such as unequal distribution of relief and of care in Islamic funded hospitals, mainly 
in Jordan. We have identified one such division in Deraa (composed of four brigades), along with two 
independent brigades.  
The regime still enjoys total control over the Druze populated province of Suweida’ and support from a 
significant part of its population. For a variety of reasons, the opposition in Suweida’ has been reluctant to take 
up arms: out of commitment to the peaceful struggle of the first months of the revolution, but also to avoid 
being caught in the civil strife and risk exposing the whole Druze community (approximately 3% of the 
population) to danger and out of fear of a violent response by the regime.  
 
The armed Druze opposition therefore had to set their base in 
neighboring Deraa province. The Revolutionary Military Council of 
Suweida led by Colonel Marwan al-Hamad includes 6 battalions 
(around 500 fighters, most of them Druze), operating in Deraa 
and conducting underground operations in Suweida. It closely 
cooperates with small units led by Druze officers operating in the 
province of Aleppo (Katibat al-Shahid Kamal Joomblat)
22
 and in 







In Al-Raqqa, Liwa’ Thuwwar al-Raqqa, commanded by Abu Eesa is a representative example of locally 
rooted brigades. It is composed of civilian activists from the city who decided to carry arms and organize as a 
unit to defend their city in face of Jabhat al-Nosra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
 24
 They are 
strongly supported by the population which sees them as a bulwark against the extremists of al-Qaeda and are 
close to the democratic movement Muwatana. In the city of Tabqa in the province of al-Raqqa, tribes have a 
strong role. Tribal groups were the first to prepare for the military fight against the regime which they tought 
early on was inevitable. 
 
                                                          
22 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaMVUEbT0Bk 
23 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngiyLYvQmqM 
24 The Jihadi group Jabhat al-Nosra split in April 2013 when part of the group merged with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s al-Qaeda branch in Iraq 
and became the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Part of Jabhat al-Nosra refused the merger and confirmed its direct allegiance to al-
Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
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Liwa’ Thuwwar al-Raqqa 
 Among them the Nasser tribe who consider themselves to be the 
original inhabitants of the province and the bedrock of the 
revolution in the region including of the armed resistance. Their 
military arm is the Liwa’ Aws al-Qurani led by Abdel Fattah al-
Sheikh Mooss (Abu Mohamad) composed of 1000 fighters. It 
includes Saraya al-Furat-Katibat al-Shura (led by Mohamad Ben 
Abdallah) which expanded recently to include three additional 
battalions. These groups were the first armed groups in the al-
Raqqa province. They played an active role in the liberation of al-
Raqqa and in the current siege on the Tabqa military airport.  
The Liwa’ held some 110 prisoners from regime forces, half of whom were liberated (mostly Sunni prisoners) 
while the other half were kept in detention in the hope that the Liwa’ could serve to negotiate the liberation of 
some of their own fighters. The prisoners seem to be held in decent conditions. Turkish journalists and 
representatives of Human Rights Watch were allowed to visit them.  
 
Talbiseh 
In Talbiseh, a large group of defected army officers from the Talbiseh area near Homs created a division and 
called it the 6
th
 division composed of several brigades and commanded by Muqadam Yusef Hadid.  
 
Formation of Military Divisions  
 
In June 2013, General Idriss attempted to reorganize the isolated local FSA brigades and merge them into 
military divisions (firqa). The goal is to bring together isolated FSA brigades and battalions, organize them into a 
professional army based on the structure of the regular Syrian Arab Army and exclude armed groups that claim 
to fight under the name of the FSA without following its values.  
In June 2013 rumors spread that the United States and the SMC will only distribute aid to groups organized 
into unified “divisions” composed of several brigades. A figure of     000 $US was circulating as being 
promised for each firqa as an incentive for groups to coalesce. 
Since this date, several divisions have been spontaneously announced and have sought to register with the 
leadership of the SMC. Division, brigade and battalion names have been replaced with numbers and military 
defectors have been given leading positions. The political orientation of each unit depends on the brigades 
involved in its initial formation. Although some divisions have clearly taken position in favor of an Islamic state, 
such as the 3
rd
 Division in Deir Ezzor,
25
 most tend to put forward a strict military and politically neutral identity. 
As these formations were only recently created and as leadership positions have been redistributed, it is too 
early to describe the political orientation of many of these divisions. Some groups such as the 10
th
 division of 
Damascus and the 33
rd
 division of Idlib are entirely composed of and led by secular nationalist elements that 
have continually refused Islamist funding.  
In late June 2013, in the liberated areas of the province of Idlib, local FSA units came together to form the 
33
rd
 division led by defected Lieutenant Colonel Ammar Dayoub. 
 
 This division brings together around 1700 fighters deployed across Idlib. They announced its formation and 
                                                          
25 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UyzHVudIOHo 
Arab Reform Initiative 





its composition on YouTube, first in a video shot in Jabal Zawiya on June 22
nd
, and then in a new video shot a 
few days later after they decided to replace all the civilian brigade leaders with defected officers.
26
 In the video, 
Lt. Col. Dayoub announces that the division is under the authority of the Northern Front of the SMC (led by 
Colonel Abdel-Basset al-Tawil).  
The division is formed of different brigades and battalions, 
whose inclination can be clearly identified as nationalist or 
secular. Founding members of the division include the former 
brigades of the Tajamuu Humat al-Thawra,
27
 which has a clear 
secular and anti-sectarian leaning. The spokesman of the 33rd 
division is Lieutenant Muhanad al-Ayssama, a defected officer 





 division.  
 
In Damascus, secular brigades operating in the southern 
neighborhoods and in the Eastern Ghoota gathered in early July 
to form the 10
th
 Division. The group is currently composed of 
1200 fighters in two brigades, Liwa’ al-Adala and Liwa’ Seif al-
Dimashqi, and is led by Yassin al-Maydani (civilian leader) and 
Captain Rami Tlass (military leader). At the time of publication, 
they were expecting another brigade to join to be able to be 
recognized officially as a division by the SMC.  
In Talbiseh as mentioned above, the 6
th
 division was created. 
Lastly and most importantly, the Jabhat Ahrar Sooriya (JAS) restructured the Front by operating a new 
vetting process of its fighters, this time individually (rather than whole battalions and brigades as it initially did) 
and formed three divisions. The current number of armed men had reached 7000 in August 2013. The three 
divisions are firqa 25, 35, and 45. They comprise five brigades each, briging the total number of brigades to 15.  
The future success and unity of these and other divisions recently 
formed across Syria will only be sustainable if they receive support 
from the SMC. If such assistance does not materialize, these groups 
will remain isolated, rely on their own personal networks of solidarity 
and remain vulnerable to defections. For example, the 33
rd
 Division 
had not received any support from the SMC at the time of finishing 
the report. The leaders of the newly formed divisions have expressed 
their concern as they face difficulties in convincing their troops to 
stay united and wait for ammunition. 
V. Fluidity  
Observers of the Syrian military scene are often perplexed by the complexity and the fluidity of the 
situation on the ground. They are most often left with the impression that no group can be trusted to remain 
away from Jihadi groups. “Where are the democrats? If only they existed, we would support them!” is the 
refrain of leaders in the West – including among those sympathetic to the Syrian resistance.  
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The names of battalions and brigades can often be misleading and should not be taken as indicative of a 
political or ideological affiliation. The majority of groups names are determined by the search for funding. Non-
Islamist groups choose names that they think will attract a rich Islamist source from the Gulf to fund them. 
Sometimes a government or a private donor offers to provide support to a brigade if it agrees to change its 
name to one with a religious overtone; many battalions carry several different names and join more than one 
coalition in order to multiply opportunities of receiving support. Conversely, extremist groups do not always 
carry names with an Islamic reference. The names of the units therefore cannot be taken as indicating the 
groups’ political or religious leaning. 
 
With every new coalition or front formed, groups disappear under one name and re-emerge with a new one 
under a different umbrella. Since June 2013 when the Chief of Staff of the SMC, General Salim Idriss, called for 
the formation of divisions as in a regular army, and reportedly promised to support each division with 200 000 
$US, many battalions and brigades gave up their names and rushed to merge into a division (firqa), hence the 
emergence of firqas, listed above.  
A battalion such as Kataeb al-Jabal al-Wastani is at the same time part of the KWW national group, joined 
the JAS and is now ready to join a firqa. The reason why they don’t dissolve the original battalion is because 
they continue to receive some funding as part of the KWW, but the money and the arms were insufficient and 
prompted them to first join the JAS and now to seek a new division in the hope that they will be decently 
equipped to fight.  
Almost all fighters, either individually or with their entire battalions have been part of at least three or four 
different groups. Some leave to join a brigade for a week or so and come back to their original unit. Units often 
keep their name but fighters move in and out of their ranks. As explained in more detail below, some of these 
movements are dictated by the need to cooperate among groups when facing an immediate threat by regime 
forces. 
 But the fluidity primarily reflects the diverse but unstable, and 
therefore unreliable, sources of funding. It is impossible under such 
conditions for any leader of a group to guarantee support to his 
fighters over several months and be in a position to retain them, nor 
can a leader refuse support offered by a source (usually with an 
Islamist agenda) without being blamed by his fighters and risk losing 
them. This has happened time and again and many leaders who have 
refused to swear loyalty to an Islamist donor have found themselves 
marginalized. Groups funded by Islamic sources with a conservative 
agenda invariably enjoy more stable funding and do not face similar 
problems. The fluidity among their troops is much more limited as a 
result. 
 
The evolution of Kataeb al-Farooq offers a good example of the loose and fluid allegiances that prevail in 
the rebellion. Kataeb al-Farooq was created in Homs by early defectors and civilian activists in summer 2011. 
Led by Abdel Razzaq Tlass, the first Syrian officer to publicly defect, Kataeb al-Farooq quickly gained popularity 
by taking a leading role in the battle of Homs in winter 2011-2012. Generous outside support, mostly from 
Qatar, allowed al-Farooq to grow and expand with branches in different parts of Syria. A year later, its northern 
branch, al-Farouq al-Shamali, took control of the border crossings of Bab-al Hawa and Tal Abyad on the Turkish 
border. Al-Farooq became one of the largest "national franchises", with many groups joining in the hope of 
receiving aid. In September 2012, Kataeb al-Farooq participated in the creation of the Syrian Islamic Liberation 
Front. However, the drying-up of funding in addition to some personal disputes led the coalition to split into 
different groups (al-Faylak al-Awal, Kataeb al-Farooq al-Islamia, Kataeb al-Farooq, Farouq al-Umma and 
others). Today the original group of Kataeb al-Farouq led by Ossama Junaydi is losing its influence and many 
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battalions are leaving as they are not receiving any more support. Many brigades, however, remain nominally 
part of al-Farooq to benefit from the brand name of the coalition. Being part of a national coalition gives local 
groups weight when dealing with rival armed groups. But these operate autonomously and have become very 
diverse. Al-Farooq has basically ceased to exist in its original structure. 
VI. Atomized but cooperating 
Despite the fluidity and the atomization of the rebel forces, independent brigades of the FSA cooperate 
effectively in the battlefield. The absence of unity and of a top-down chain of command does not imply a lack 
of cooperation. However, tensions have recently emerged between radical Islamist and secular argroups.  
The general staff of the Supreme Military Council has attempted 
to unify independent local groups through provincial military 
councils. These councils were set up to distribute weapons, 
ammunition and salaries and set up the early stage of an organized 
army with a centralized chain of command and supply distribution. 
However, the expected results were not reached, as a lack of 
resources did not enable the new local military councils to become 
the main sources of support to FSA armed groups. A minority of 
brigades became directly linked to the military councils but most 
remained independent and rely on informal networks of support.  
Examples of cooperation abound. Operation rooms (Ghurfat 
amaliyat), for example, are set up for each battle, bringing together 
all the commanders of the brigades participating in the battle 
irrespective of their ideological affiliation.  
They agree on their respective roles and on the distribution of the war spoils. Very often, a brigade in a 
quiet area will send a group of fighters to fight for a few days on another front under the command of another 
brigade. Many stories are reported where an armed group has a certain type of weapon, but needs to "borrow" 
a fighter from another brigade because he alone masters the use of the said weapon. Fighters often shift from 
one brigade to another; this is especially the case when brigades do not provide salaries, to the point that many 
soldiers regularly change brigades depending on the developments in the battlefield and on the supply of 
weapons and ammunition to a certain group. Surprisingly, the fact that a fighter quits a brigade for another one 
is rarely seen as a problem by brigade leaders. A unit leader is the “owner” of his stock of weapons but not of 
his men, meaning that a fighter can quit a unit for another one as long as he leaves his weapon with his former 
unit.  
Local rebel groups have also created security committees bringing together members of different brigades 
to take charge of securing roads and communicating any suspicious movements of regime forces. When a 
particular area is under attack, local brigades or the security committees quickly circulate information to all 
groups in the area. An alert system has been set up to disseminate information about the movement of aircraft 
and helicopters. When a fighter-jet or a helicopter takes-off from a military airport, information about its 
movement is immediately passed through walkie-talkie allowing potential targets to find cover.  
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However, in the battlefield and in rebel-controlled territories, groups 
often don’t cooperate on equal terms. Moderate groups lacking resources 
often find themselves dependent on the logistics of Islamist-funded 
brigades and end-up “assisting” them rather than participating in the 
battle on an equal footing. For example, fighters of Katibat Shuhada’ Al-
Hurriya in Jabal Al-Zawiya complained of having only one car for 150 
fighters and were therefore dependent on other groups for the 
transportation of the fighters to the battlefield and for the evacuation of 
the wounded. The role assigned to each brigade is decided in an ad hoc 
operation room, in which the most well equipped group takes the leading 
role. Poorly equipped brigades often do not have sufficient ammunition to 
stay in the front line for a long period of time and are often given the role 
of securing the surrounding roads while better-equipped armed groups 
take part in the assault. During the battle for the airport of Taftanaz
28
, the 
radical Islamist group Jabhat al-Nosra together with the Salafi movement Ahrar al-Sham, took the lead while 
small and poorly equipped local groups, such as Liwa’ Shuhada’ Saraqeb, were only given an auxiliary role.  
 
VII. Rising tensions with radical Jihadi groups  
Increasing tensions between FSA fighters and radical Islamist groups have been reported in the last few 
months. A description of some of the recent clashes between mainstream groups and the radical Islamist/Jihadi 
groups provide insight into what is becoming in some cases a three way confrontation. A line has clearly been 
crossed after the clashes in al-Raqqa and Aleppo. Pro-democracy leaders of the FSA, local activists, lawyers and 
community leaders complain about the acts of intimidation on the part of radical groups such as Jabhat al-
Nosra, Ahrar al-Sham and groups of foreign fighters. In July 2013, several people were killed in clashes between 
radical Islamist groups and brigades from the FSA. Earlier in the spring, tensions existed but isolated clashes 
were kept under control and cases of Jihadi aggression against the FSA or against activists were publicly 
attributed to the regime so as to contain further tensions.  
 
Tensions in Al-Jabal al-Wastani  
A mountainous region in the western province of Idlib, Al-Jabal al-Wastani is one of the main strongholds of 
the secular rebel group, the Kataeb al-Wehda al-Watania. Tensions there had been rising for some time 
between local rebels and Jabhat al-Nosra. Islamists frequently accused KWW fighters of being apostates 
because they oppose the establishment of an Islamic state. On June 19 2013, elements of Jabhat al-Nosra 
entered the village of al-Hamama and assassinated two civilians who they accused of having owned a bar in 
Damascus. Following the incident, a group of fifty Jabhat al-Nosra fighters tried to enter the village of al-
Amoudia located west of the town of Darkoush on the road to the city of Idlib, this time to arrest someone they 
suspected of collaborating with the regime. Elements of the Shuhada’ al-Jabal al-Wastani brigade, part of the 
KWW, stopped the group at a checkpoint and denied them entry into the village saying that it was the local 
court’s jurisdiction to investigate such cases. As tension between the two groups rose, the KWW gathered 
seven of its battalions present in the region and forced Jabhat al-Nosra to leave the area. The following day, a 
number of brigade leaders of northern Idlib gathered and formed an alliance against Jabhat al-Nosra. This 
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alliance included 10 brigades: 
  Liwa’ Shuhada’ al-Jabal al-Wastani, led by Lieutenant Colonel Safi Abdel Karim  
Liwa’ al-Reef al-Shamali, led by Ghayth Bakour; 
 Liwa’ Ahrar al-Jabal al-Wastani, led by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed al-Ali; 
 Liwa’ al-Ghufran, led by Riyad Taha; 
 Liwa’ Majd al-Islam, led by Abdel Munim Ghanoum; 
 Liwa’ Ahbab al-Rassoul; 
 Liwa’ Sayd al-Shuhada’, led by the Colonel dr. Samih al-Ayssa; 
 Liwa’ Ahrar al-Zawiya, led by Abu Sayd ; 
 Katibat al-Hurr, led by Ahmed Jumaa; 




, elements of Jabhat al-Nosra tried to seize the checkpoint located at the entrance of the village 
of Maghat al-Jamous, held by the KWW. Members of Jabhat al-Nosra were arrested and finally released after 
negotiations with their leader. Clashes were avoided and the situation in al-Jabal al-Wastani remained under 
the full control of the KWW at the time of this report. 
Clashes in al-Dana  
While the KWW and their local allies have been able to keep Jabhat al-Nosra away from their stronghold, 
other secular brigades have had more serious issues with extremist groups. Elements of the 33
rd
 Division in 
Idlib violently clashed with extremists after a long period of mounting tensions. In June 2013, the 33
rd
 Division 
was created in the province of Idlib, gathering mainly secular and nationalist brigades from across the province. 
The main component of this new grouping is the Tajamuu Humat al-Thawra, a secular group with minorities 
within its ranks (as described in Section IV above). In mid-June, Ahrar al-Sham declared their refusal to fight 
alongside secular groups and expelled the Tajamuu Humat al-Thawra from the battle for the control of the 
Latakia-Aleppo highway in Idlib. After pressure from local FSA groups including Tajamuu Humat al-Thawra, 
Ahrar al-Sham finally agreed to allow them to take part in the assault.
29
 
The 33rd Division of the FSA has brigades in the town of al-Dana in the northeastern part of Idlib province. 
This area is known for being a stronghold of militant Islamist groups coming from abroad. The al-Qaeda 
affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), has been gradually taking control of the town.  
On 5 July 2013, an anti-ISIS demonstration broke out and Islamist militants reportedly opened fire on the 
protestors. Elements of the 33
rd
 Division intervened to protect the demonstrators and clashed with ISIS. Major 
clashes broke out later that day when members of the 33
rd
 Division and civilians who had taken part in the 
demonstration, went to the Islamic court to try to file a complaint against members of the ISIS. The 33
rd
 
Division was ambushed by elements of the ISIS as they arrived at the Islamic court. Dozens were killed on both 
sides including the leader of one brigade from the 33
rd 
Division, Ahmed al-Qash, who was beheaded. The local 
ISIS group, led by a Tunisian Jihadi, Abu Oussama al-Tunisi, has since taken total control of the town.
30
  
                                                          
29 The authors interviewed fighters in Syria as they came back from the battle after being excluded by Ahrar al-Sham. 
30 The Presence of Al-Qaeda raises tensions in Syria, Al-Jazeera English, July 9 2013 
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Attack on the FSA leadership breaks the ‘Sacred Union’  
Kamal al-Hamami (alias Abu Basel al-Ladkani) was killed by members of ISIS on 11 July 2013, marking a 
turning point in the relationship between Jihadi groups and the FSA. Kamal al-Hamami was a senior FSA leader, 
a member of the Supreme Military Council and led the Kataeb al-Izz Ben Abdel-Salam in northern Latakia.
31
  
Similar provocative steps were recently taken by the Jihadi group, ISIS, in openly targeting FSA leaders, 
civilian activists and political figures in an attempt to take control of the rebel-held areas. ISIS has hardly taken 
part in any recent battles against the regime and clearly concentrates on imposing its rule on the northern 
areas. The province of al-Raqqa and several towns in northern Aleppo
32
 are now largely under ISIS control.  
The FSA’s reaction is for the moment uncertain. While some leaders confess in private that the only way for 
the FSA to retake control over the northern territories is by directly confronting ISIS, many fear that opening a 
new front will only benefit the regime.  
The Fight over the Province of al-Raqqa 
Tensions have been particularly high in the province of al-Raqqa. Jabhat al-Nosra and Ahrar al-Sham arrived 
in the region in January 2013. The leader of Kataeb al-Farooq
33
 for the province of al-Raqqa, Mohamed Daher, 
allegedly killed a Jihadi leader named Fares al-Absi at the Bab al-Hawa crossing with Turkey in September 2012. 
Since then, tensions have risen between al-Farooq on one side and Jabhat al-Nosra and ISIS on the other. 
Mohamed Daher survived several assassination attempts while a number of local FSA and tribal figures have 
been killed. Jihadis were rarely accused in public and after such incidents; tribal mechanisms of reconciliation 
were usually activated to prevent an all-out confrontation between the groups.  
Tensions intensified, however, in June 2013 after a series of 
events. In early June, elements of ISIS stormed the headquarters of 
Kataeb al-Farooq in the city of al-Raqqa, arresting 25 people and 
evicting Kataeb al-Farooq from the city. This allowed the Jihadi 
groups, mainly the ISIS and Ahrar al-Sham to exert total control over 
al-Raqqa. A day after expelling al-Farooq, ISIS expelled local tribal 
brigades affiliated with al-Farooq from the border post of Tal 
Abyad.
34
 Al-Farooq’s leader in the province of al-Raqqa, Mohamed 
Daher, had to flee to Turkey following clashes with elements of the 
ISIS. On 11 July 2013, ISIS arrested members of the local council of Tal 
Abyad and took control of the wheat silos of northern al-Raqqa.  
 
In reaction to the hegemonic control of radical Islamist groups on the region, the local population has held 
several demonstrations and sit-ins against ISIS and Ahrar al-Sham. A group of civilians created the brigade liwa’ 
thuwwar al-raqqa (described above) and the FSA is starting to reorganize in an attempt to bring the province 





 In this statement, the FSA declared that it will not allow the existence of any armed groups 
in al-Raqqa outside of the control of the 11
th
 Division of the FSA and declared Jihadi groups an illegitimate 
component of the rebellion.  
                                                          
31 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23283079 
32 In July 2013, ISIS had complete control over the town of al-Dana, and partial control of the border town of Jarablous and the surrounding 
villages. 
33 Kataeb al-Farooq is coalition of FSA brigades originating from Homs but now widespread across Syria (see Section 3 above). It is part of 
the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front.  
34 In July, the border post was handed over by ISIS to Ahrar al-Sham.  
35 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3i7sBnMdK4   
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The consensus among groups had so far been to protect the unity of arms, and numerous examples exist of 
tensions resolved through peaceful means. However, the level of resentment against Jihadi groups by the 
civilian population and part of the FSA has grown to the point where it became clear to many that radical 
Jihadis had become a serious threat to the revolution. The Sacred Union that had prevented infighting within 
the armed opposition is not upheld at any price anymore. It should not be seen as further division within the 
uprising but rather as an attempt at re-gaining control of the resistance and its original objectives. Yet it does 
imply a painful recognition that the conflict has become a triangular struggle involving the regime, radical 
Jihadis and the democratic opposition. 
VIII. Acting to secure a democratic outcome 
Short of a political settlement, Syria’s transition will be strongly influenced by the military configuration in 
the battlefield. As long as the prospects of such a political solution are remote, and no direct intervention to 
protect the Syrian population happens, all parties will continue to give priority to the military balance on the 
ground. Intervening to shape the situation on the ground is the best way to increase the chances of achieving 
the desired outcome of a pluralist democratic Syria.  
 
Some countries in the West are now tempted to look at Syria as the 
new arena in the global war on terror. Maintaining this perspective risks 
leading to an absurd fight against ghosts of the kind that US President 
George Bush waged during his presidency, in which downing one terrorist 
led to the emergence of dozens of new ones. In this type of fight, the 
criminal Assad regime might start to be seen as an ally.  
 
There is a consistency problem in complaining that the strong and well 
endowed groups are controlled from outside (mostly by countries with an 
Islamist agenda) while dismissing the ones who are not controlled from 
outside as too weak to make a difference. This seems to have been for a 
good part of the last two years the self-defeating rationale. What this 
report shows is the current state of the forces on the ground. This reality 
was different six months ago. The number of Jihadis was much smaller and 
there was no talk of the democratic revolution being ‘kidnapped’ as many 
believe today. Looking ahead six months from now, there are good reasons to expect that if no decisive action 
is undertaken, supporters of a democratic outcome in Syria will have lost more ground to the groups they 
depict as dangerous and moderate military and political figures will further lose their relevance.  
 
 
Some key implications and directions for action emerge from this analysis: 
 
Making of the ‘proxy war’ an opportunity. Those who depict the Syrian conflict as a proxy war stop short of 
drawing the right implications. If money and arms are defining the direction of the conflict, the fluidity 
described above should be used as an opportunity to shape the situation and influence the outcome. The pro-
democracy groups are sure to attract new fighters to their fold and to grow rapidly if provided with the right 
kind of support. They have the potential to spearhead a movement to alter the balance of power in the 
battlefield and reassure a large portion of Syrians sitting on the fence. 
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Engaging in the battle of narratives. The regime continues to devote a huge budget for its media strategy in 
spite of its financial strain in order to keep control on the narrative of the conflict. In parallel, Arab satellite 
television networks have mostly contributed to promoting the Sunni Jihadi groups by broadcasting images of 
fighters holding the black flag and wearing black hair bands celebrating military successes and taking exclusive 
credit for them. Pro-democracy groups have the weakest presence in the Arab and international media and 
need to become more visible.  
 
Engaging the governments of the region who are providing support. 
Western countries who denounced Assad’s crimes have largely relied 
on regional actors to provide financial and military support for what 
was understood to be a common objective of ending the Assad 
regime.  
They have often ignored the real agenda of these governments and 
failed to see how they select the recipients of the support. It is high 
time that Western governments make clear to their regional allies 
that the identity of the aid recipients on the ground must be 
compatible with the desired outcome of a democratic, pluralistic, 
united Syria and that support for certain groups with a non-
democratic agenda is frightening to many Syrians and delaying the 
fall of Assad. 
 
Selecting effective leaders as interlocutors. Working with outside 
patrons of Syrian armed groups is a necessity, for reasons already mentioned, but this is likely to perpetuate 
the proxy aspect of the conflict. In order to re-Syrianize the resistance, the safest way to operate in such a fluid 
environment is to engage the leading figures connected with the armed groups of the three categories we have 
identified: professional military officers who defected from the army and remained on the ground inside Syria; 
political opposition figures with a clear democratic affiliation, or community leaders at the local level. These are 
the effective leaders who provide guidance to armed groups and have been securing minimal funds for them to 
survive. They are the most reliable partners in building constituencies for a democratic outcome. 
Only a comprehensive strategy that combines civil and military support can allow pro-democracy groups to 
regain ground. The supply of basic assistance, essentially food and medical care for the fighters of pro-
democracy groups is just as important as the procurement of weapons. In addition, the best way to allow the 
pro-democracy groups to gain cohesion is to guarantee a minimal monthly allowance for fighters over a 
reasonable period of time (e.g. one year). Many governments who do not wish to be involved in military 
support could still contribute to empowering pro-democracy groups by providing for the basic needs of the 
fighters’ families. One example is that of the KWW described above. With very modest but stable funding and 
clear political guidance, KWW fighters have remained faithful to their units. They lack arms and ammunition 
but very few, if any, have left their brigades.  
 
Working towards a credible chain of command for the SMC. There is every reason to believe that General 
Salim Idriss is genuinely working to build a military structure and a credible chain of command for the Supreme 
Military Council. It remains, however, a structure in the making and can at best coordinate between different 
fronts, ideally on a regional basis, but in reality it has had to integrate some existing blocks which had gained 
their strength thanks to support from sources with an Islamist agenda such as the Syrian Islamic Front or the 
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Syria. Any future success at building cohesion among pro-democracy groups 
will make them an effective bloc within the SMC. A coalition such as the Jabhat Ahrar Sooriya (JAS) has in effect 
replicated the model of the Islamist fronts which first pooled units together in a united front and are now 
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Advanced weapons come as a result. Stable and reliable support of the kind we mentioned is the only way for 
leaders of pro-democracy groups to retain the loyalty of their fighters and ensure effective command. Only 
then will the discussion about which groups should be supplied with sophisticated weapons find an adequate 
answer.  
 
Empowering pro-democracy groups while respecting unity of ranks. Mainstream Islamists groups who are 
part of the Free Syrian Army and are represented within the Supreme Military Council continue to be massively 
funded and are currently the dominant force on the ground. A strategy aimed solely at unifying the ranks of the 
FSA as it currently stands carries the risk of acknowledging and confirming the hegemonic position of Islamist 
groups. An effective strategy to alter this balance is to support and empower leaders of democratic groups to 
redress this balance in their favor within the FSA itself. General Idriss can be considered a non-biased channel 
for transferring arms and aid to groups on the ground but even then, governments often earmark funds and 
arms to specific groups and the General is not always free to deliver them to groups of his choice. It is therefore 
possible to work through the SMC while designating the beneficiaries of the support. 
Helping the FSA face attacks from extremists.  Nearly all groups within the Free Syrian Army know that the 
showdown with the extremists will happen sooner or later. They differ only over the right timing of it. A 
majority would prefer to conduct the fight themselves as opposed to witnessing drone strikes by foreign 
powers. Here again, many groups identified in this report believe the extremists should be confronted now 
without delay and are hoping for the right equipments to do so. 
Empowering the pro-democracy groups is the starting point for an effective strategy of developing projects 
of a civil nature. Civil institutions such as civil administration, education and, most importantly, legal 
institutions are in dire need of support. The latter is the strongest case in point. Notwithstanding a few 
exceptions, it has been very difficult and in many cases impossible, to operate a court applying Syrian civil law 
in areas where Islamic funded groups have control over security. Civil tribunals cannot enforce a sentence 
without the assistance of a police force or some local armed group. Support for civilian institutions is therefore 
vital to allow civil resistance to continue while military support is needed to correct the balance in favor of pro-
democracy groups. But doing the former without the latter can onely lead to prolonging the situation, rather 
than accelerating an end to the conflict. 
 
Targeting areas where the regime is still in full control. In the coastal region or in Suweida, for example, both 
areas where minorities (Alawites and Druzes) are either a majority or strongly present, small groups with a 
clear democratic agenda are working quietly against the regime. They are willing to take significant risks and 
are yearning for support. Providing limited quantities of small arms to such groups would pose a serious 
challenge to the regime as these are the areas where it believes it enjoys support and will hesitate to respond 
with massive bombings in the same way that it does in areas where the support for the resistance is massive. 
 
The intent is not to divide the resistance. For now, the pro-democracy groups remain at the mercy of the 
Islamist funded groups in most of the significant battles. If properly equipped, they would be in a position to 
cooperate on equal footing with moderate Islamist groups and would be able to register some visible military 
achievements to make a psychological shift inside and outside Syria. As to the extremists of Jabhat el Nosra and 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, nearly all groups within the Free Syrian Army know that the showdown with 
the extremists will happen sooner or later. They differ only over the right timing of it. A majority would prefer 
to conduct the fight themselves as opposed to witnessing drone strikes by foreign powers. Here again, the 
groups identified in this report believe the extremists should be confronted now without delay and are hoping 
for the right equipments to do so.  
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Pre-empting the emergence of a demarcation line. Cities and areas targeted by the regime over the last six 
months such as Homs, al-Hoola and Qusair are confirming suspicions about its intent to define a strategic 
corridor linking the Mediterranean coast to Damascus, thus accelerating the fragmentation of the country 
along sectarian lines. Whether Assad will be supported in his folly by his allies in Moscow or Tehran is difficult 
to predict. In any case, it is critical in this context to support groups which can maintain enclaves of resistance 
along the projected corridor in order to prevent the creation of a line that could emerge as the demarcation 
line in a partition plan. 
The entire armed resistance, from all backgrounds, agrees that the fight against the regime has to continue 
and this is likely to remain the case as long as no alternative option appears within reach. But the Syrian 
resistance has been facing a deadly conundrum over the past year. Every increase in aid provided by Sunni 
Islamist sources in return for loyalty to some Islamist agenda has heightened fears among more Syrians 
concerning the outcome of the conflict and has led Russia and Iran to intensify and deepen their involvement 
on the side of the Assad regime.  
It is vital for the future of Syria, but also for the survival of the ethnic and sectarian mosaic of the Middle 
East, to regain the ground controlled by the Jihadis. A democratic system that provides the space for effective 
local governance in areas where certain communities are concentrated is the only viable option. Either Syria 
becomes a democracy or it will cease to exist as a unified state within its current borders.  
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List of Acronyms  
 
FSA                  Free Syrian Army 
ISIS                  Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham) 
JAN   Jabhat al-Nosra (Jabhat al-Nosra Li-Ahl al-Sham) 
JAS                   Jabhat Ahrar Sooriya (Front of the Freemen of Syria) 
KWW     Kataeb al-Wehda al-Wataniya (National Unity Brigades) 
SIF   Syrian Islamic Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya al-Sooriya) 
SILF                  Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya li-Tahrir Sooria) 
SMC                Supreme Military Council 
SNC              Syrian National Coalition (National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces) 




Glossary of Arabic military terms  
 
 
Katibat / Kataeb          Battalion(s) 
 
Liwa’/  Alwiya              Brigade(s) 
 
Firqa / Firq                                             Division(s) 
 
Jabhat                                                     Front  
 
Tajamuu                   Grouping 
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36 Jabhat Ahrar Sooriya announced on July 19th 2013 that it will re-organize its forces into military divisions (firqa). 
37 Some names cannot be disclosed for security reasons. 
38 Most units have lists with names of registered fighters. We only mentioned armed fighters. Units usually have registered fighters 
without weapons. We did not include those. Many civilians wish to join the fight if arms were available and register waiting to receive 
weapons. 
39 Units marked with * constitute the Kataeb al-Wehda al-Watania (see description page 16) 
JABHAT AHRAR SOORIYA36 
Name of the 
Groupings / 
Units 




Province Operating area Estimated 







Led by a 
committee 























Hader Sheikh  
al-Shebab 




























// Hama Salamiya // 
Katibat al-Shahid 
Ahmad Muraiwed*  
Mohamad  
al-Hashish 
Deraa Sahl Horan // 
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Idlib Khan Shaykhoon 1 290 
Tajamuu Ahrar 
Deir Ezzor 

















Colonel Zyad Haj 
Obeid 










Habib Abu Ghuraib Idlib Idlib-Southern 
countryside 
?? 























Aawad Abu Ali Idlib Sajra 165 
Liwa’ Ahfad 
Othman 
// Homs Al-Hoola al-Aaqrab 410 
Katibat Abdallah 
Ben Masood 
// Homs Homs-Old city // 
Katibat Fursan al-
Izza 


















Mahdi Mohamad Hama Jabal Shahshabo 700 





                                                          
40 The Brigade of the protection of civilians and infrastructures is in charge of the protection of dozens of factories, public and private 
property. 
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Amjad al-Haddad Hama Jabal Shahshabo 














Liwa’ al-Muutasem Sheikh Abu 
Mondher 










Kafr Zita // 
Liwa’ Rijal al-Haq Lieutenant Hassan 
Abud 
Hasaka Al-Shadidi // 
Liwa’ Shaalan // Hasaka Al-Shadidi // 
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AUTONOMOUS FSA UNITS  
 
Name of the 
Groupings / 
Units 





Province Operating area Estimated 













Abu al-Tayeb Aleppo Azaz 200 
Kataeb al-
Booraq** 
Hasan Mohamad Aleppo Azaz 105 
Liwa’ Jabhat al-
Enqadh** 







Aleppo South Aleppo 
province 
// 
Liwa’ al-Adel** General Abdel-
Nasser Farzat 






















Nizar Barakat Aleppo Atareb 270 
Liwa’ Ain Jaloot*** General Ahmad  al-
Faj 
Aleppo Atareb // 
Liwa’ Saqr al-
Quraish*** 
Amar Batabihi Aleppo Atareb // 





Aleppo Atareb // 
Liwa’ Majd al-
Islam*** 
// Aleppo Atareb 700 
                                                          
41 Some names cannot be disclosed for security reasons. 
42 Most units have lists with names of registered fighters. We only mentioned armed fighters. Units usually have registered fighters 
without weapons. We did not include those. Many civilians wish to join the fight if arms were available and register waiting to receive 
weapons. 
43 Units marked with ** constitute the Jabhat Ahrar Halab (see description page 19) 
 
44 Units marked with *** constitute the Tajamuu Alwyat al-Muutasim billah  (see description page 19) 
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AUTONOMOUS FSA UNITS (continued) 
Quwat al-
Maghawir 
// Damascus-Deraa Eastern Ghoota – 
South Damascus 
// 
Firqa 10 Abu Yaseen al-
Maydani/ Captain 
Rami Tlass 
Damascus South Damascus/ 
Eastern Ghoota 
1 200 
Liwa’ al-Ghuraba’ Defected Major 
(anonymous) 
Damascus Qalamoon, al-Tal 400 
Liwa’ Ababeel 
Horan 






























Abu Said Rajab Damascus Dooma/Ghoota 
Sharqiya 
250 







Captain Abu Jamal Damascus Daraya 6 battalions 
Al-Majless al-











Captain Fares  al-
Jawza 
Deir Ezzor Deir Ezzor City 140 
Liwa’ al-Basha’er // Hama Hama city 160 
Liwa’ Shabab 
Eddin 
Abu Mahmood Hama Hama countryside 350 
Liwa’ Ahrar 
Salamiya 











Homs North of Tadmor 88 
Katibat Ashbal Iza Sofian al-Naimi Homs Tadmor 58 
                                                          
45 Revolutionary Military council of Suweida’  
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Lieutenant Iz Eddin 
al-Asaad  










Homs Tadmor 68 
Katibat Shuhada’ 
Saraqeb 
// Idlib Saraqeb // 
Liwa’ Yoosef al-
Azma 
Anas al-Zeer Idlib South of Salqeen 700 
Firqa 33 Aammar Dayoob Idlib Idlib province 1 654 




Idlib-Homs-Latakia Homs and Idlib 
countryside- Jabal 
Akrad in Latakia 
300 
Katibat al-Hojra Captain Mohamad 
Rahal 
Latakia Jabal al-Akrad 1 500 
Liwa’ thuwwar al-
Raqqa 
Abu Eissa Raqqa Raqqa city // 
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